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Introduction 
 
As a result of the 2008 world food crisis, many international investors (private and sovereign 
funds) have engaged in a race for land acquisition and food production.  The phenomenon, 
however, is increasingly criticised in the public sphere, which commonly refers to it as a ‘land 
grab’.  A major question, therefore, would be to determine to what extent Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) in agriculture differ from other kinds of FDI, that is, to consider whether 
agriculture-oriented projects are in essence development-unfriendly. 
 
The few existing reports by international authoritative organisations as well as 35 press and 
NGO comments collected during the first quarter of 2010 denounce many alleged deals 
around the world.  In many countries, however, land remains the property of the state whilst 
investment contracts, as strictly confidential documents, are not available publicly.  The lack of 
reliable primary data, in other words, makes it difficult to determine if land is sold or leased 
on long-term basis. 
 
This working document provides an overview of the trend based on the cross analysis of 
secondary sources.  First, a geographical map of the trend is drawn in an attempt to 
emphasise who invests and where.  Second, its origins are considered, including the 2008 
food crises and the impact of increased demand for biofuel.  The authors, overall, use the 
terms of “agri-FDI” and “agri-trend”, deemed more neutral than the more subjective “land-
grab”.  This document, in addition, constitutes the basis of a forthcoming paper, which in 
turn will formulate hypotheses and questions as to whether agriculture-oriented investments 
differ from traditional FDI. 
 
1. Country analysis 
 
The first section of this paper focuses on establishing a general and non-exhaustive portfolio 
of land-dealers sorted in a regional and alphabetical order. 
 
1.1 Land-letting states portfolio. 
 
(a) African states 
Kenya, as a relatively small land-letter, allegedly concluded a 40,000 hectares agreement with 
Qatar.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo, on a much larger scale, allegedly sold about 3 
million hectares of land. Its most important deal was apparently concluded with China, which 
acquired 2.8 million hectares for biofuel cultures.2  The financial counterpart for this deal 
however remains unknown.  The Republic of South Africa also acquired, on the basis of a 30 
years renewable lease, 200,000 hectares of land in a deal that allows tax exemptions, export 
of produces and repatriation of profit without restrictions.3  
 
 
* Antoine Martin, LL.B (Paris V), LL.M International Law (Surrey), PhD Candidate and Associate Lecturer in Public International Law, Surrey 
International Law Centre (SILC). Mulugeta M Ayalew, PhD (Surrey), EMLE (Manchester, Ghent and Rotterdam), LLM (Ghent), LLB (AAU), 
Associate Lecturer, University of Surrey School of Law, Environment Regulatory Research Group (ERRG).  This paper was presented during a 
MS,c course at the Centre for Environmental Strategy (University of  Surrey, February 2011) 
1 Dave Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times <http://farmlandgrab.org/9559/print/> accessed 10/03/2010 
2 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad'; See also John Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st-century African land grab’ The 
Observer  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/07/food-water-africa-land-grab> accessed 23/03/2010 
3 Khadija Sharife, ‘Africa: Land grabs - new 'resource curse'?’ <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/19079.html> accessed 08/03/2010 
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Ethiopia is another land-selling state, which will be considered further in our research paper 
while dealing with the correlation between food-aid and land deals.4  Although the country 
benefits from international food aid, the government has identified 3 million hectares of land 
(1.7 million hectares according to another source5) to be leased to foreign investors.  Reports 
suggest that 815 agriculture-related foreign-financed projects have been approved by the 
government since 2007.6 
 
Liberia allegedly entered, in 2007, into a US$ 30 million rice production project with the 
Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the Libyan Sovereign Fund.7  Interestingly, the case 
illustrates a major criticism of foreign land acquisitions: the ability of foreign investors to fully 
repatriate harvests to their home-states while possibly leaving local populations without 
access to the produced food.  The Vice-President of the LIA Felipe Gego, on the one hand, 
affirmed that the company would bring mechanised farming processes allowing three rice 
harvests per year, to be shared between local and international markets.8  Although meeting 
local food needs apparently constitutes an official pillar of the project, NGOs on the other 
hand suspect that the rice produced might eventually be integrally exported to Libya.9  Libyan 
rice needs amounted to the import of 177,000 tonnes worth US$62 million in 2005.10  
 
Traditionally known as a rice importer, Mali also constitutes a relevant case of land-deals.  An 
important step in the agricultural history of Mali indeed lies in its Government initiative to 
help farmers produce more and achieve self-sufficiency through a major government reform 
of the Office du Niger, the agency in charge of managing agricultural and irrigation schemes 
around the Niger River.11  Mali has now become a major rice exporter,12 although increased 
production and export are not due to improved domestic land-use.  Rather, such an evolution 
is essentially due to the handing over of many lands to the Libyan LIA fund and Chinese 
companies.13  The Malian Government, however, is criticised for having recently offered 
100,000 hectares of land in Mali’s main rice production area,14 as part of a larger project 
including roads and canal enlargements.15  Providing the official Libyan version of the deal, 
Amadou Kante dit Bany, Representative of the Libyan fund and Charge de mission for the 
Presidency of the Republic of Mali, emphasises that the 100,000 hectares were originally 
given for free by Mali to the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) a few years ago.  
However, because the CEN-SAD process was too slow, Libyan President Kadhafi and Malian 
President Amadou Toumani Toure decided to create ‘Malibya Agriculture’, a branch of the LIA 
collaborating with the Chinese government-led Rice Foundation which provides hybrid 
seeds.16  The objective, as the representative formulates, is “to produce rice corresponding to 
the needs of Mali, Libya, and of all the states of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
 
4 Forthcoming 
5Argaw Ashine, ‘Ethiopia: Hunger-Ridden Country Defends Land Grabs’ Business Daily <http://allafrica.com/stories/200908140576.html>  
accessed 08/03/2010 
6 Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st century African land grab’ The Observer 
7 Grain, Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty in Africa (January 2009), p2 
8 Toe, ‘Libya offers to assist Liberia in rice production’ The Liberian Times  <http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KKAA-
79Z8B6?OpenDocument> accessed 13/03/2010 
9 Grain, 'Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty in Africa' p2 
10 Ibid 
11 Gerald Diemer, ‘Office Du Niger - Reforms; Reform of Governance of the Office du Niger in Mali’ (International Network on Participatory 
Irrigation Management, 2004)  <http://www.inpim.org/leftlinks/FAQ/Newsletters/N12/n12a5.htm> accessed 12/03/2010 
12 Ibid 
13 In fact, Chinese rice seeds would be used in these projects, while as in Liberia, Chinese contractors would be involved into infrastructure 
construction. See Grain, 'Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty in Africa', p1-3  
14 Saouti Haidara, ‘Interview of Amadou Kante dit Bany, Representant of the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio and Charge de mission for the 
Presidency of the Republic of Mali, Translated from French; Les investissements libyens sont une aubaine pour le Mali’ L'independant  
<http://www.temoust.org/les-investissements-libyens-sont,5283> accessed 14/03/2010 
15 Grain 'Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty in Africa', p1 
16 Haidara, ‘Interview of Amadou Kant edit Bany: les investissements libyens son tune aubaine pour le Mali’, L’independant 
 
 
 
6
                                           
(CEN-SAD)”.17  Although the project’s impacts on Malian needs can be debated, Amadou 
Kante dit Bany’s suggests that “Libyan investment are a godsend for Mali as they originate 
less from the usually witnessed frenzied profit-seeking motivations than from the political 
commitment of the two highest leaders of our two brother states to tighten, a little more 
every day, links of all kinds between our states and peoples”.18  In other words, a political 
commitment based on south/south solidarity could be a pillar of the foreign land acquisition 
trend. 
 
Of lower importance is a Malian project with Lonrho, a London Stock Exchange quoted 
company exclusively focused in South-African development and operating in sectors such as 
infrastructure, transport, agribusiness, hotels and support services.  While a 25,000 hectares 
deal was allegedly being negotiated in 2009, some recall that the company already owns 
25,000 hectares of land in Angola and is currently discussing a 100.000 hectares deal in 
Malawi.19 
 
Mozambique is an interesting actor of the current land deal practices because it plays a dual 
buyer/seller role.  Mozambique owns 20,000 hectares of land in Mauritius but also acts as a 
partner of the LIA Libyan fund, which owns 20,000 hectares of its land.20  Reporting on World 
Bank analyst Klaus Deininger’s confidential (and inaccessible) comments, Grain emphasises 
the existence of 13 million of Mozambican hectares ready for land concessions since the 
government started its agricultural FDI policies.  About 1.3 million hectares might have 
already been conceded without the population having been properly informed.21 
 
Also massively dependent on international food aid, Sudan is a hub for Middle-East and Asian 
food investors.  South Korea is the biggest foreign owner of Sudanese land (690,000 
hectares), followed by the Egypt (400,000 hectares).22  The presence of Saudi Arabia in Sudan 
is also established on the basis of a 42,000 hectares deal,23 while others commentators 
suggest the existence of a US$45 million contract.24  Data on the United Arab Emirates, also, 
mention a 400,000 hectares deal together with a possible possession of 750,000 hectares of 
Sudanese land.25  The Middle-East presence in Sudan is furthermore justified by official 
comments reported by The Economist according to which the country might seek to give one 
fifth of its cultivated land to Arab governments.26  For Abdul Rahim Ali Hamad, State Minister 
of Agriculture (Sudan), farming investments - by Arab states - were worth some US$700 
million in 2007 and have risen to 3 billion in 2009,27 while a US$7.5 billion stationary phase 
was expected for 2010.28  Whereas agri-investment represented only 3 percent of all 
investment in Sudan in 2007, they represented 17 percent of such investments in 2009,29 
which demonstrates the massive role and opportunities of Middle-East investors. 
 
 
17 The original text, in French, reads “pour produire du riz destine à répondre aux besoins du mali, de la Libye et de tous les autres Etats de la 
CEN-SAD” 
18 “Les investissements libyens sont une aubaine pour le Mali car dictés moins par la recherche effrénée de profit, comme on a l’habitude de 
le voir, que par la volonté politique des deux plus hauts dirigeants de nos deux Etats frères de resserrer, chaque jour un peu plus, les liens de 
tous ordres entre nos deux entités et nos deux peuples“, in Haidara 
19 Grain 'Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty in Africa', p3 
20 Grain, ‘Mauritius leads land grabs for rice in Mozambique ’ <http://www.grain.org/hybridrice/?lid=221>  
21 Ibid 
22 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad’ 
23 Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st century African land grab’ The Observer 
24 Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times 
25 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad’; See also Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st century African land grab’ The Observer 
26 Ibid. The Economist 
27 Yara Bayoumy, ‘Sudan eyes growth in Arab agri investment’ Reuters  <http://farmlandgrab.org/2971> accessed 04/05/2010 
28 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad: Outsourcing’s third wave' 
29 Bayoumy, ‘Sudan eyes growth in Arab agri investments’ Reuters 
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n grain processor) might also be planning to sell 500,000 hectares to Gulf 
vestors.39 
 also secured a deal over 2.470,000 hectares 
 2008 in exchange for oil and gas contracts.41 
.2 Land-seeking states Portfolio 
 considered as major actors of agricultural FDI. Privately-held 
nds cannot also be excluded. 
                                           
Tanzania might strongly benefits from foreign investments in agriculture although few data is 
available.  South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates might have interests in the country, 
and China is said to have negotiated an agreement for a five-year livestock and fishing 
contract.30  An article in The Economist furthermore mentions India’s help to Tanzanian 
financial institutions through the offer of special farm credit.31 
 
Finally, Uganda is said to be in a partnership with Egypt.  The deal would consist into a lease 
over 840,000 hectares, granted to Egyptian firms for the harvest of wheat and maize.32 
 
(b) Non-African states 
Many developing countries situated out of Africa also have an interest in those deals. 
Pakistan, for instance, constitutes a new target, especially for Middle-East investors such as 
Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Bahrain, an important importer of dairy and livestock goods.33  
Publicly-available information suggests that the Emirates allegedly entered into negotiations 
with Pakistan in 2008 on US$400 - 500 million worth deal amounting to 100,000 to 200,000 
hectares of land.34  This suggests a price of US$ 2,500 to US$ 4,000 value per hectare. 
 
The Philippines are also said to be in partnerships with Japan and Qatar, which could own 
millions of hectares of its lands.35  China owns 1.2 million hectares of lands in the 
Philippines.36 
 Russia allegedly entered into an 80.400 hectares deal with China worth US$21.4million (this 
allows suggesting a US$ 266 price per hectare).37  Swedish funds such as Black Earth Farming 
and Alpcot Agro also respectively own 331,000 and 128,000 hectares of Russian land.38  Pava 
(first Russia
in
 
Finally, Ukraine is the target of several privately held international investment funds.40  
Morgan Stanley, for instance, recently bought 40,000 hectares of Ukrainian land.  
Renaissance Capital, a Russian Fund, also concluded a 300.000 hectares deal, while the UK 
Fund Landkom apparently negotiated a 100.000 hectares agreement to be extended to 
350,000 hectares by 2011.  The Libyan LIA Fund
in
 
1
 
A map of the main land-seekers can therefore be drawn.  Middle-East states as well as China 
and South-Korea can be clearly
fu
 
30 Frank Kimboy, ‘Tanzania, China in lucrative cattle deal’ The Citizen <http://farmlandgrab.org/10473/print/> accessed 10/03/2010; See also 
Durbach and The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad' 
31 The Economist, Crumbs from the BRICs-man's table (London March 20th 2010) 
32 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’ GRAIN Briefing, p6 
33Ashfak Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’ The DAWN Media Group  <http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/15/ebr17.htm> 
accessed 11/03/2010 
34 Ibid. 
35 Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times 
36 Luzi Ann Javier, ‘China Losing Farmland, $5 Billion Lease Contracts Get Filipino Farmer’s Opposition’ the Bloomberg (New York, USA, Feb. 
21, 2008) <http://chinaview.wordpress.com/2008/02/25/china-losing-farmland-5-billion-lease-contracts-get-filipino-farmers-opposition/>  
37 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
38 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad; See also Farmlandgrab.org, ‘Black Earth yields fall as Russia wheat hopes fade’ (31/08/2010) 
<http://farmlandgrab.org/15122>  
39 Ibid. The Economist 
40 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’p9 
41 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
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Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam, on the basis 
f 20 to 30 years leases.43 
 invest US$350 million in 
frica and Eastern Europe to grow rice, barley, wheat and oilseeds.44 
ents in Italy, Canada, 
lgeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Pakistan, Malta, Morocco, Egypt,47 or Liberia.48  
 
(a) Middle-East states 
Gulf States, as previously emphasised, play an important role in financing agriculture 
development in Africa. Their involvement illustrates the recent strong political commitments 
towards food independency of their leaders.  Saudi Arabia FDI agricultural policies, for 
instance, flow from the so-called ‘King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment 
Abroad’, amounting to massive levels of investments: US$100 million in Ethiopia, US$45 
million in Sudan, 500,000 hectares in Tanzania to raise wheat, barley and rice on the basis of 
a lease agreement which also envisages investors exemption from tax in the first few years 
and the ability to export the entire production back home.42  State-owned as well as privately-
owned investment funds also make a major part of the gulf FDI agricultural policies. In Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, the Al-Qudra Holding planned to acquire 400,000 hectares by 2009 to 
produce wheat, maize, rice, vegetables and livestock in Australia, Croatia, Egypt, Eritrea, 
India, Morocco, Pakistan, 
o
 
In the Emirates, similarly, the Pharos Miro Agriculture group was launched in November 2009 
as a joint venture between Pharos Financial Group (Emirates) and Miro Holding International 
(London), and attracted the interests of many gulf funds.  The fund, amongst other things, 
seeks 50,000 hectares in Tanzania for rice production and projects to
A
 
(b) North African states 
North Africa must also be considered as an eminent player. Previously cited as the main actor 
of multi-million dollar projects in Liberia, Mali and Ukraine, the Libyan fund (LIA) was created 
in 2006 to manage Libya's oil revenues and to diversify sources of national income. 45  It is a 
holding company which manages the investment fund of the government by reinvesting the 
profits generated by its oil and gas industries in various areas of the international finance 
market.  The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) was furthermore established in August 
2006 as a branch of the LIA. Ruled by Bachir Salah, President Kadhafi’s Cabinet Director,46 the 
US$8 billion capital fund benefited from a transfer of the assets of major Libyan funds and 
financial groups such as the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company controlled by the 
Central Bank of Libya and [whose] activities include industry, commerce, agriculture, tourism, 
real estate.  The LAP more specifically manages oil revenues, airways companies, investment 
banks, energy mining and petrochemical industries, hotels, but also owns shares in 
international football teams such as the Italian Juventus.  It has investm
A
 
This might suggest that land acquisition makes part of a more general massive FDI trend 
involving the Middle-East states.  As The Economist recently emphasised, Harrods “the luxury 
department store in London was sold to Qatar’s sovereign-wealth fund for £1.5 billion 
(US$2.2 billion).  The Qatari fund has invested heavily in British assets.  It is the biggest 
                                            
42 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad'; See also Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times  
s long-term lease on Tanzanian farmland’, 25th January 2010 available at  
y: les investissements libyens son tune aubaine pour le Mali’ 
n Africa, p2 
43 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
44 This Day, Gulf Firm Seek
< http://www.thisday.co.tz/?l=10573> 
45 http://www.lia.ly/ Accessed 04/05/2010 
46 Haidara, ‘Interview of Amadou Kant edit Ban
47 http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/libya.php 
48 Grain, Rice Land Grabs undermine food sovereignty i
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hareholder in Barclays and J. Sainsbury and holds the second-biggest stake in the London 
.49 
to invest 30 billion won (US$30 
illion) in Paraguay and Uruguay.53  Finally, a 100,000 hectares deal took place in Tanzania 
ough relevant data is hardly accessible. As a 
atter of certainty it can be stated, however, that corporations cannot buy land in Japan, and 
ts in 
entral and South-East Asia, South-America and Burma are also considered by China. Finally, 
dy been invested. Overall, 
outgoing Indian ambassador to Ethiopia Gurjit Singh believes that Indian general investments 
will reach between US$8 billion and US$10 billion in a few years.62 
                                           
s
Stock Exchange”
 
(c) Asian states 
South Korea is an essential international investor as far as Asian agri-FDI are concerned. 
Flowing from its 2008 formulation of a national plan oriented towards the acquisition of 
foreign land for domestic food needs, the country took some options in Sudan,50 Argentina, 
and South-East Asia.51  Through mergers and acquisitions, South Korean investors 
furthermore invested US$6.5 million to acquire a majority stake in Khorol Zerno (10,000 
hectares in eastern Siberia),52 while Korean companies and governmental institutions also 
secured deals in Indonesia, Philippines (94,000 hectares), Cambodia, Mongolia. In late 2009, 
the government furthermore communicated its intention 
m
after an aborted 1.3 million hectares deal in Madagascar.54 
 
Japan relies entirely on the private sector for its food imports and is therefore said to 
constitute an active international investor alth
m
therefore are most likely to buy land abroad.55 
 
China conducts wide FDI projects in agriculture. Implanted in Cameroon,56 Congo and 
Tanzania, it has also started a US$800 million project seeking to “modernise” agriculture in 
Mozambique.57 A 2 million hectares biofuel project is also negotiated in Zambia.58 Projec
C
a 80.400 hectares deal worth US$21.4million might have been negotiated with Russia.59 
 
Finally, India, due to soil fertility and water-supply issues, recently had to import 4 million 
tonnes of lentils from Burma.  According to Grain, India even considers sending its farmers 
there to grow food themselves,60 and banks might have invested US$150 million to start 
producing wheat and rice on about 30,000 to 50,000 hectares of land by 2011.61 It is also 
reported that 2,000 Indian companies (from a list of 8,000 candidates) might have secured 
land in Ethiopia where more than US$2.5 billion might have alrea
 
49 The Economist, Business this week, May 13th 2010 
50 The Economist, ‘Buying farmland abroad: Outsourcing’s third wave’ (London) <http://farmlandgrab.org/3037> accessed 11/03/2010 
51 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p5 
52 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad' 
53 Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times 
54 Ibid 
55 The Economist, Private equity in Japan, the waiting game (London March 20th 2010) 
56 Charles Nforgang, ‘Chinois au Cameroun : une incompréhension foncière’ Syfia Info  <http://www.landcoalition.org/cpl-
blog/?p=4154#more-4154> accessed 10/03/2010 
57 Grain, ‘Mauritius leads land grabs for rice in Mozambique ’ 
58 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad'; See also Durbach and Vidal 
59 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
60 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’p5 
61 Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times 
62 Ashine, ‘Ethiopia: hunger-ridden country defends land grabs’ Business Daily 
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2. Origins and Actors 
 
The facts behind the agri-trend beeing established, its origins should then be considered. The 
2008 food crisis appears as a major cause of this FDI race for arable lands.63 The impact of 
biofuels should be considered too. That being said, the land acquisition trend is not new, 
although several evolutions may be witnessed. 
 
2.1 The role of the 2008 food crisis  
 
The 2008 food crisis is a major cause of this FDI race for arable lands.  In an increasingly 
globalised context, the correlation of unstable trade exchanges, low food reserves and 
expanding demography increasing global demand inescapably led to the effect that the single 
worldwide market failed to provide for the worldwide needs in food supply.64  The 
consequences of such a change, generating up to 140% price increases for cereals and raw 
food,65 are consequently obvious.  As some formulate, “due to the boom, the cost of pasta in 
Italy is expected to increase by 20%.  In the UK, bakeries predict they too will pass on further 
wheat price rises, and in France the cost of a baguette, a staple of the French diet, is expected 
to rise”.66  To these could furthermore be added riots in Mexico resulting from an increase in 
the cost of tortillas generated by more expensive cereals.  
 
Such events eventually took a peculiar dimension once considered by financial minds.  Some 
indeed started to talk of “foodflation”,67 an evolution from what economists at Merrill Lynch 
called “agflation” in 2007,68 and introduced the idea that such new prices, far from 
representing a peak, would provide investors an opportunity to prosper over the coming 
years.69  Answering questions on investments prospects in agriculture, Ravi Sood, co-founder 
and President of Lawrence Asset Management Inc. indeed confirmed that due to massive 
inflation in agricultural commodities and inputs in 2007-2008, agriculture emerged as its own 
asset class.  Financial interest over agricultural goods might therefore constitute a permanent 
shift, which suggests that increasing amounts of attention and capital could be directed 
towards agriculture stocks and commodities in a close future.70 
 
Suffices to say that the consideration of the food crisis through a profitability perspective led 
to animated debates, and are at the origin of the so called ‘land rush’,71 or ‘land grabs’ 
denounced by most commentators.  Summarised by Grain, the situation amounts to the 
following: “on the one hand ‘food insecure’ governments that rely on imports to feed their 
people are snatching up vast areas of farmland abroad for their own offshore food 
production.  On the other hand, food corporations and private investors, hungry for profits in 
 
63 See Carin Smaller and Howard Mann, A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign investment in agricultural land and water, International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (May 2009) 
64  Alexandra Spieldoch, "Global Land Grab" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, June 18, 2009) 
 <http://www.fpif.org/articles/global_land_grab> accessed 09/03/2010 
65 Sharife, ‘Africa: Land Grabs – new resource curse?’ 
66 Philip Scott, ‘How to invest in rising food prices’ This is Money <http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/food#ixzz0n4KPFOXa> accessed 
05/05/2010 
67‘How best to invest in agriculture’ The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-ideas/how-best-to-
invest-in-agriculture/article1423758/> accessed 05/05/2010 
68 Hao Jin, ‘Five Reasons to Invest in Agriculture ’ <http://seekingalpha.com/article/128333-five-reasons-to-invest-in-agriculture> accessed 
05/05/2010 
69 Scott, ‘How to invest in rising food prices, This is Money 
70 'How best to invest in agriculture', The Globe and Mail 
71 Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st century African land grab’ The Observer 
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the midst of the deepening financial crisis, see investment in foreign farmland as an important 
source of revenue”.72 
 
Unsatisfactorily, however, such an approach remains barely surface-scratching for the agri-FDI 
trend cannot be solely considered from the perspective of greedy investors and through the 
pejorative terms of ‘land grab’.  First, investors in many cases are as above-mentioned state 
entities (sovereign states and sovereign funds) investing for the purpose of providing their 
own populations with food, in which circumstances greed is not to be seen.  Second, while it 
is easy to point-out poor or developing economies selling their lands to investors, few 
commentators consider whether these countries have the basic financial means to exploit 
their own land in the first place. 
 
2.2 The impact of biofuel production 
 
Corollary to rocketing food prices, the impact of biofuel production should be considered. 
Several sources indeed mention a World Bank internal document by Don Mitchell, revealing 
that biofuel production might be at the origin of a 75% growth in food prices. Although the 
amounts are hardly verifiable due to the confidential nature of the document, the argument 
nevertheless remains probable. The US, for instance, produced in 2007 about 40 billion litres 
of biofuel, amounting to 40% of world corn trade.73 The top-three grain producers’ (ADM, 
Cargill and Bunge) benefits in turn increased by 103% between 2007 and 2009.74  In other 
words, the increase in food prices occurred not only from increased demand for alimentary 
purposes, but also from its use as a green energy resource, the production of which was 
furthermore increased by the massive peaks in oil prices witnessed recently. 
 
2.3 A new trend? 
 
Opinions vary as to the recent nature of the agri-FDI trend.  While some argued in December 
2008 that “most of the land acquisitions took place during the last nine months”,75 Grain 
interestingly recalls that in practice “land grabbing has been going on for centuries”.76 Grain 
makes reference to the post-war Soviet Union collective farms given to foreign investors in 
1991, or to the UK attempt to get a former colonial land in Tanzania under Southern 
Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme.77  Similar allusions to ‘colonial times’ also exist in the public 
debate as far as cocoa and coffee exports are concerned,78 and the Chinese massive 
transportation of national farmers abroad gives further credit to the allusion. Overall the 
comparison between foreign farmland investments and colonialism is not very flattering and 
remains debatable.  Grain, however, is more convincing when it emphasises the presence of a 
long-term food strategy by contrast to the financial interest of private equity funds, therefore 
constituting two distinct but parallel agendas surrounding the global farmland investment 
debate.79 
 
72 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’ 
73 Sharife, ‘Africa: Land Grabs – new resource curse?’ 
74 Ibid 
75 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
76 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p2 
77 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad' 
78 Spieldoch, ‘Global land grab’, Foreign Policy in Focus 
79 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p2 
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(a) Evolution towards inventive long-term strategies to feed home-populations at a reasonable 
price 
Food security issues constitute an underlying factor of the agri-FDI trend, which in turn 
constitutes an inventive and carefully thought long-term strategy to feed peoples at a good 
price. For instance, while China has long been recognised as remarkably self-sufficient as far 
as food is concerned, its demographic evolutions and economic developments led to 
population migration, eventually replacing agricultural land by industrial infrastructures. In 
addition, the deterioration of the soil quality due to overexploitation, excessive artificial land 
fertilisation and inappropriate farming techniques, combined with pollution (by industrial 
emissions and wastes) reduces the country’s chances to answer the needs of its population. 
Furthermore, while China is due to feed 300 to 400 million people in the next 30 years, urban 
residents during the same period will increase from 47% to 75% of the population. Increased 
industrialisation, also, implies the construction of additional roads, factories and 
infrastructure, and less land shall be available for agriculture in the future. As a result, China 
imported 42 million tonnes of soya in 2009 from the US, Brazil and Argentina,80 and is said to 
have negotiated about thirty agricultural deals in exchange for technologies, training or 
infrastructures as previously showed.81 
 
Surprisingly, however, China denies such land deals.  Han Jun, expert on rural policy at the 
Development Research Centre indeed argued: “we don’t believe that going to rent farm in 
other countries is a reliable policy option”.82  That being said, many comments as to Chinese 
practices challenge such a denial. 
 
South Korea, similarly, is an extremely densely populated country as well as a fast developing 
nation.  As for China, rapid economic and demographic evolution has led to the replacement 
of farmland and forests by industries and factories, a phenomenon to be associated once 
again to extensive urban development during the last two decades.  As a result, the country is 
increasingly dependent on food imports, and therefore has increased recourse to foreign 
farmlands.  As previously discussed, growing food overseas remains cheaper and safer than 
reliance on international trade variations.83 
 
Perfect examples of desert-based nations, Gulf States, also provide an interesting perspective 
on the food security issue, for although they suffer insufficient water resources to grow food, 
their oil and petrodollars grant them the benefit of constituting the client-model of foreign 
farmland investors.  The Emirates, for instance, imported 85% of their food needs in 2008, a 
costly US$2.9 billion outflow84 which logically gave it strong incentives to negotiate a 
US$400-500 million worth project for the exploitation of 100,000 to 200,000 hectares of 
land in Pakistan during the same per
 
Saudi Arabia, for similar reasons, undertook a self-sufficiency programme consisting in 
growing wheat in the desert.  The country endured the food crisis to the extent that 80% of 
the population consists of rice-eating migrant workers and hence dependent on food 
importation.  In addition to food shortage and price increases, the Saudi money, indexed on 
 
80 Jonathan Watts, ‘China's soil deterioration may become growing food crisis, adviser claims’ The Guardian  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/23/china-soil-deterioration-food-supply> accessed 23/03/2010 
81 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p3 
82 Watts, ‘China’s soil deterioration may become growing food crisis’ The Guardian 
83 Durbach, ‘Korea’s overseas development backfires’ Korea Times  
84 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
85 Ibid. 
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US dollars - whose value has been decreasing lately as a result of the financial crisis – faced 
inflation and accordingly suffered more expensive products, raising the cost of its food 
imports from 8 to 20 billion dollars.86  The project, however, was abandoned in 2008 by fear 
of water shortages and the country therefore emerged as a major importer.  Following the 
Emirates’ approach (and as demonstrated in the first part of this paper), Saudi Arabia 
accordingly became an important farmland investor, with the clear objective of exporting its 
foreign production back home.87  The Saudi Fund for Development was created in 2008 for 
this purpose as a US$566 million special investment programme for buying land abroad in 
order to produce rice and wheat.88  
 
As Grain explains, Gulf States’ strategies therefore consist in growing elsewhere what they 
cannot afford to produce domestically. As previously demonstrated with Mali and Libya, these 
states acquire or rent land in the neighbouring Islamic countries, in exchange for capital, oil 
contracts and cooperation as a means to cut their food costs by 25%.89  
  
(b) Cash-seeking private-equity funds 
The financial interests of private-equity funds constitute a second agenda surrounding the 
global farmland investment debate. While state entities investing in foreign farmland 
essentially seek feeding their own populations, financial actors rather consider agri-FDI as 
profit sources.  Although for NGOs “food and financial crises combined have turned 
agricultural land into a new strategic asset”,90 the scheme is not that simple.  While the 
expectations flowing from price rises generated by the food crisis are obviously debatable, 
farmland investments cannot be considered as profitable cash-drawers, at least not in the 
short-run.  Indeed, these do not constitute typical speculation in the sense that while most 
deals are realised upon finished products or existing and palpable resources, such projects 
require massive investments before production capacities can be improved and generate 
profits. 
 
Interestingly, however, an evolution in the size of such investors can be emphasised.  New 
conglomerates in practice are bigger than the traditional market leaders such as Nestle, for 
instance, and this can partly be explained by the fact that more than 40% of FDI nowadays 
take place through mergers and acquisitions.91  For instance, while important land 
transactions traditionally corresponded to 100,000 hectares deals,92 today’s agreements 
entered into by private investors lead to the negotiation of 400,000 to more than a million of 
hectares projects. Various commentators furthermore cite the involvement of famous 
international groups,93 such as Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Blackrock (a US$200 million 
hedge fund having allegedly invested US$30 million in land acquisition deals), Morgan Stanley 
(recently negotiated 40,000 hectares in Ukraine),94 Renaissance Capital (a Russian fund 
involved in a 300,000 hectares deal in Ukraine), Landkom (UK fund involved in a 100,000 
hectares deal in Ukraine to be extended to 350,000 by 2011).  Black Earth Farming and 
 
86 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p4 
87 Qatar News Agency, ‘Saudi Arabia Eyes Overseas Farmland Investments’ (17 March 2010) at < 
http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/Foreign_News/Economics/Pages/SaudiArabiaEyesOverseasFarmland17032010.aspx>; See also The Economist, 
'Buying farmland abroad' 
88 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
89 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’, p9 
90 Ibid. p2; See also Grain, ‘The new farm owners: Corporate investors lead the rush for control over overseas farmland’ 
91 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2009) 
92 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad' 
93 Grain, ‘SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security’ 
94 See also The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad' 
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Alpcot Agro, two Swedish funds, similarly, would have negotiated agreements for the 
exploitation of 331,000 and 128,000 hectares in Russia.95 
 
The increasing interest of private funds for agri-FDI projects raises many debatable 
commentaries.  Although comments as to the ability of private funds to make money on the 
food crisis are most likely founded, denouncing the private sector’s objective to seek profit 
remains far-reaching.  NGOs, for instance, denounce that “private investors are not turning to 
agriculture to solve world hunger or eliminate rural poverty. They want profit, pure and 
simple […] in many cases, the goal is to generate revenue streams both from the harvests and 
from the land itself, whose value they expect to go up”.96  The statement, however, remains 
disturbing since corporation are not created for philanthropic and charge-free activities but 
rather for explicit profit-making purposes.  While this argument has the merit to recall the 
notion of corporate responsibility, criticising financial groups for their ability to generate 
benefits therefore remains far-reaching.  Food production in itself remains part of world trade 
and can hardly constitute a reprehensible activity.  Questioning food production therefore, 
only makes sense while taking a food crisis ethical approach.  Profits in this situation become 
ethically suspicious, a sensation furthermore aggravated by the idea such funds in practice 
might be backed-up by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World 
Bank, or the International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) which, through their pro-
FDI policies indeed are criticised for urging states to make ownership by foreigners possible.97 
 
(c) State-owned funds 
While agri-investments by state entities possibly look more ethical than similar exercise by 
private funds, the treatment of state-owned funds should be considered. Previously 
mentioned, Gulf funds are apparently fully integrated within governments’ long-term 
strategies to feed their populations.  For instance, the Saudi fund ‘Al-Qudra Holding’ planned 
to acquire 400,000 hectares by 2009 to produce wheat, maize, rice, vegetables and livestock 
in Australia, Croatia, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, 
Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam, and this for periods of 20 to 30 years.98  The Emirate Pharos Miro 
Agriculture fund was similarly launched in 2009 as a joint venture between the Pharos 
Financial Group (Emirates) and the Miro Holding International (London-based), attracting 
many Gulf entities having an interest in growing rice, barley, wheat, oilseeds through US$350 
million investments in Africa and Eastern Europe.99 
 
More problematically, however, many deals might be less clear than expected.  Oliver Barnes, 
Chief Executive of the Miro fund, for instance, declared that a major interest for states to 
invest in funds “would give sovereign wealth funds a new channel of investment, without 
having to deal with all the other risks or even to disclose their identity publicly, to avoid 
creating frenzy”.100  What such a comment might imply, however, requires further analysis. 
 
95 Ibid. 
96 Grain, ‘The new farm owners: Corporate investors lead the rush for control over overseas farmland’; See also Grain, October 2008 #76, p7 
97 Bokhari, ‘Buying foreign land for food security’, The Dawn Media Group 
98 Ibid. 
99 This Day, Gulf Firm Seeks long-term lease on Tanzanian farmland’ 
100 Ibid. 
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Concluding remarks: Who invests and where? 
 
First, a brief mapping of international agri-FDI projects can be made at this stage.  It appears 
that the African continent is the most receptive to such FDI. At least, it is the most 
experienced so far by contrast with the very few Asian and South-East European countries 
which have hardly attracted agricultural foreign investors (so far).  Asia, Eastern-Asia and the 
Middle-East, in turn, clearly emerge as essential agri-FDI-funding regions, although various 
trends can be seen.  For instance, it seems that Asian investors favour the ultimate financial 
outcomes rather than the location of the investment, while Gulf actors appear to focus on 
close countries and markets.  The use of a world map suggests that agricultural FDI 
originating from Gulf countries indeed take place in Pakistan or within states situated on the 
eastern coast of Africa.  Therefore, fast sea or road access between Gulf States and their 
targeted partners presumably constitutes the essential motive of such investments.  Cultural 
and traditional links between African and Middle East countries could furthermore be 
considered as a reinforcing factor.  FDI movements, overall, appear to constitute South-South 
transactions.  As some emphasise, “contrary to past trends, countries in the Global South are 
initiating much of the investment; the Persian Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, are investing in many parts of Africa, as 
well as Asia and Eastern and Central Europe”.101  The scale of those deals, however, is hardly 
quantifiable. For observers such as Grain, the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), the International Land coalition or Action Aid, up to 50 million of 
hectares have been acquired by foreign investors worldwide.102  Estimates by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute, by contrast, suggest that between 15 and 20 million of 
hectares, amounting to a fifth of the European Union farmland, might have been subject to 
transactions worth US$20-30 billion since 2006.103  The data compiled during the first quarter 
of 2010 for the purpose of this non-exhaustive research similarly accounts for about 16 
million hectares. 
 
Second, various entities take part in the agri-trend.  States obviously lead the process as land-
letters as well as investors.  Funds, then, tend to be increasingly involved as both investment 
vehicles and fund raising entities.  Interestingly the nature of these funds varies from state-
owned to privately-held structures, which amongst other things suggests that states overall 
remain the widest agri-FDI actors. In many circumstances, however, it remains difficult to 
establish whether investors are state-owned or private-equity entities.  The government of 
China, for instance, is known for being a major shareholder in many companies involved in 
FDI.104 
 
Finally, while it is said that many investors seek to make a financial benefit from the food 
crisis, profits should be separated from state investments responding to national food needs.  
Thus, the increasing South-South trend in FDI suggests that states benefiting from long-term 
strategies to feed their people are more illustrative of the agri-FDI practice than the so-called 
‘land-grab’ scandals denouncing the horrendous calculations of easily attackable but 
nonetheless questionable funds speculating on the food crisis. 
 
101 Spieldoch, ‘Global land grab’, Foreign Policy in Focus; See also UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2009’ 
102 See for instance Vidal, ‘How food and water are driving a 21st century African land grab’ The Observer 
103 The Economist, 'Buying farmland abroad: Outsourcing’s third wave' 
104 See for instance Jing Duanmu, ‘Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese MNEs’ Journal of World Business 
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